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World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism, by 
Michael C. Rea. Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. ix + 245. Cloth $35.00. 
DALE JACQUETTE, The Pennsylvania State University 
In an age dominated by the success of technology and the natural sci-
ences, empirical evidence and abductive explanatory power seem to 
belong exclusively to philosophical naturalism at the expense of traditional 
theisms, while theists seem to have nothing more persuasive than wishful 
thinking or a subjective psychological compulsion dressed up as a revela-
tion or religious' experience' to support their belief in the scientifically 
unverifiable reality of a divine supernatural being. 
Against this common way of thinking about the methodological and 
doctrinal inequality dividing theism and atheism, naturalism and super-
naturalism, Michael C. Rea argues that naturalism is not a thesis after all, 
but a research program, that as such naturalism lacks rational foundation, 
and that naturalism suprisingly is committed to rejecting realism about 
while offering no adequate basis for accepting the existence of material 
objects and other minds. Rea maintains that every thinking human subject 
has a research program, without which nothing could count as evidence 
even for the most mundane kinds of inquiry. There are individual and 
shared research programs, but in both cases research programs can at most 
be discarded but can never be adopted on the basis of evidence. 
Accordingly, it can never be rational to accept any research program. We 
can have good reasons for rejecting a research program, but positive com-
mitment to a research program is never more than a matter of disposition. 
Rea's book is divided into three main parts. After an Introduction that 
anticipates and summarizes his central conclusions, Part I discusses 
Naturalism by outlining selected historical episodes in a chapter on the 
'Pillars of Naturalism', from which Rea extracts the salient features of 
'Naturalism Characterized'. Part II on Ontology raises difficulties for natu-
ralism as Rea characterizes its research program in chapters on 'The 
Discovery Problem', inadequately handled by appeals to 'Proper Function' 
and 'Pragmatic Arguments', culminating in the question 'What Price 
Antirealism?' Here Rea collects the problems he claims are encountered by 
naturalism as antithetical to the existence of material objects and other 
minds. Part III, Alternatives, proceeds on the assumption that the defeat of 
naturalism in previous sections requires rethinking fundamental assump-
tions in epistemology. Rea contrasts 'Intuitionism', which he discredits as 
a special faculty or intellectual source of knowledge for discovering the 
intrinsic modal properties of material objects and justifying the existence 
other minds, thus leaving the field exclusively to the only alternative he 
supports, a version of 'Supernaturalism', in which he defends the method-
ological advantages of theism over naturalism. 
Rea's distinction between thesis and research program, and the claim 
that research programs can never be accepted on the grounds of evidence 
is a postmodernist wolf dressed up in analytic sheep's clothing. If an 
inquirer justifiably or not believes that there are only two possible research 
programs and comes to reject one on the basis of evidence, which Rea 
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admits can happen, why would it not be rational to adopt or at least gravi-
tate loward the only remaining alternative? To consider the case directly 
relevant to Rea's study, if we think that the origin of the universe can only 
be explained by naturalism or supernaturalism, and we come to reject 
supernaturalism, say, on the basis of the problem of evil, why would it not 
then be rational to adopt naturalism as constituting the only viable 
research program of choice? Why, in the first place, should anyone agree 
that naturalism is a research program rather than a thesis? Unfortunately, 
Rea nowhere explains or tries to define what he means by a thesis as con-
trasted with a research program. He is satisfied to use these terms and 
draw upon what he takes to be their methodologically charged implica-
tions without saying precisely what differences are supposed to hold 
between them and how they are supposed to be interrelated. 
All we learn from Rea's book about the distinction between a thesis and 
a research program is that Rea regards naturalism as a research program 
rather than a thesis, and that as a research program naturalism necessarily 
functions theoretically without rational foundation. We do not even know 
enough about Rea's distinction between theses and research programs to 
know whether these are the only possibilities for the classification of natu-
ralism, or whether naturalism might instead be an ideology, theory, frame-
work for a thesis, or something else yet again, and if so what ramifications 
another categorization might have for Rea's claim that naturalism lacks 
rational foundation. Nor does Rea provide examples of genuine philo-
sophical theses for the sake of comparison so that the reader can try to 
determine whether a thesis is or is not open to the same limitations as 
research programs. We do not even have enough information to know 
why or in what sense naturalism is correctly classified as a research pro-
gram, or whether the argument against its being a thesis can also be adapt-
ed to show that naturalism cannot be a research program either. Oddly, 
and in a way that we are never in position to assess in Rea's exposition, 
naturalism, as the subtitle of his book indicates, despite being a research 
program, is nevertheless understood as having consequences like those of 
any thesis in terms of which at least its unacceptability can be judged. 
Since Rea never says exactly what he means by a thesis, we cannot decide 
whether the best alternatives to naturalism are genuine theses that we can 
rationally adopt, or other research programs that of necessity are equally 
lacking a rational foundation. 
When we tum to the question of exactly what might be meant by natu-
ralism, Rea again does say enough. He argues that there is no reasonable 
construal of naturalism as a thesis, so that we must classify it instead as a 
research program. There is no obvious system to the alternatives Rea con-
siders, however, so we do not know whether he has eliminated all of the 
possibilities or overlooked what might otherwise tum out to be the most 
promising answers. The mere fact that the literature contains conflicting 
accounts of naturalism is interesting but inconclusive for this purpose, 
because it might only reflect confusions or differences in perspective about 
the concept. A useful way of thinking about naturalism that Rea does not 
try to refute formulates naturalism as the thesis that all and only those 
putative entities actually exist that are hypothesized, entailed, or presup-
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posed by a correct natural science. This definition avoids the need to 
describe naturalism as a research program, which in some sense it also 
undoubtedly is, and answers Rea's main objections to naturalism as a 
research program that is incompatible with a commitment to the reality of 
material objects or other minds. 
Where the unexpected implications of naturalism in conflict with mate-
rialism and the existence of other minds, Rea offers an interesting but 
unpersuasive line of objections. He argues that naturalism is incompatible 
with commitment to the reality of material entities because of what he calls 
the Discovery Problem. This is the alleged epistemic obstacle uniquely 
encountered by naturalism in trying to determine the intrinsic modal prop-
erties of material objects. Against the existence of other minds Rea resur-
rects the frequently discussed problem of sustaining an analogical infer-
ence to the existence of another consciousness from the inductively weak 
single case basis of the thinker's first person experience of internal mental 
states. Later, in the book's final chapter, Rea argues that these defects of 
naturalism are surmounted by supernaturalism and the belief (or is it a 
thesis?) that the world is the product of divine intelligent design. These are 
exciting claims by which Rea's work projects a revolutionary metaphilo-
sophical outlook on the dialectical interrelationships governing far-reach-
ing theoretical constructions in philosophy, science and religion. If his con-
clusions are correct, Rea's criticisms eliminate an obstruction to and 
encourage instead the cultivation of theism and supernaturalism in light of 
the epistemic limitations and metaphysical disadvantages he attributes to 
philosophical naturalism. 
The problem throughout Rea's discussion is its myopic focus on easily if 
not succinctly defeated strawmen. When he has refuted these, he still 
leaves the strongest contrary and sometimes most obvious opposing views 
untouched. Thus, not only does Rea not try to explain what he means by 
the key concept of science, but from what he does say it appears that he has 
a narrow excessively skewed and to that extent implausible view of what 
scientists actually do and what science actually involves. He concludes 
that naturalism is incompatible with belief in the existence of material 
objects because materialism presupposes that there are intrinsic modal 
properties of material entities that cannot be 'detected' by empirical means. 
Natural science, however, is ontically committed to the existence of many 
kinds of putative entities that do not make their presence known on any 
Geiger counter. Science is best construed not merely as a systematization 
of observations, but as a structure of hypotheses that support one another 
in a mutually justificatory coherence network that is empirically justified in 
complicated ways. If we emphasize the hypothetical as well as the obser-
vational aspect of natural science, then it is hard to see how can there possi-
bly be any objection to philosophical naturalism as including such hypo-
thetically posited putative entities as material objects, including their 
intrinsic modal properties, if any, and other minds. These items, whose 
existence Rea does not prove in the first place beyond remarking that they 
are widely accepted, do not need to be discovered, but only hypothesized 
by a justified application of natural science in order to satisfy the proposed 
definition of philosophical naturalism as a bona fide metaphysical thesis. 
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In this spirit, it may be worthwhile to look more closely at Rea's argu-
ment for the Discovery Problem. Even if it is true that intrinsic modal 
properties cannot be empirically detected, this fact does not detract from 
naturalism's grounds for commitment to their existence as a reasonable 
hypothesis or as entailed or presupposed by the reasonable hypotheses of 
natural science. In lieu of a convincing argument by Rea that there are 
such modal properties, it might be the better part of naturalism anyway 
not to include them in its ontology but to withhold judgment concerning 
their existence. Rea, moreover, overlooks an important distinction 
betvveen intrinsic logical and intrinsic causal modal properties. It might 
better be said that contingently existing material objects do not and cannot 
even be imagined to have intrinsic logical modal properties, except in the 
trivial sense of having a fortiori the logical possibility of instantiating what-
ever other logically contingent properties they happen to instantiate, along 
with the logical necessity of instantiating tautological properties and not 
instantiating logically inconsistent properties. 
Despite the nonexistence of intrinsic logical modal properties, and con-
trary to Rea's argument that naturalism cannot accommodate any intrinsic 
modal properties, material objects might nevertheless be said to have and 
even in some sense to be defined in terms of their intrinsic causal modal 
properties. Intrinsic causal modal properties might be understood as those 
a material entity has by virtue of falling under a particular empirically 
established causal law, by which some strength of causal rather than logi-
cal necessity is implied. Whereas empiricists and naturalists are free to dis-
agree among themselves about whether there can be intrinsic logical 
modal properties of material objects, Rea says nothing whatsoever to 
exclude the empirical discovery of intrinsic causal modal properties, rea-
sonably attributed at least hypothetically to contingently existent material 
objects whenever an appropriate causal law is discovered or confirmed as 
applying to certain kinds of material entities. A bullet, accordingly, might 
naturally be such that it must be projected through space with a force equal 
to it~, mass times its rate of acceleration, given the law of kinematics by 
which f = ma, not as a matter of intrinsic logical necessity but of intrinsic 
causal modality. A naturalist on this account can easily include any of the 
usual candidates for causally modal dispositional properties that are 
empirically justified, such as the property of being brittle, soluble, or the 
like. All we seem to need is the good old-fashioned covering law model in 
the natural sciences, while the Discovery Problem as an epistemic obstacle 
to reliably determining the logical or causal modal properties of material 
entities does not seem to be resolved in any way by the proposition that 
the world is designed by a divine supernatural being. 
As for Rea's conclusion that the naturalist is inherently prohibited from 
justified commitment to the existence of other minds because of the prob-
lem of supporting an inductive inference from a single first-person case, 
the objection here is also circumvented by the hypothesizing role of science 
and by the observation that many kinds of inductive generalizations are 
epistemically warranted by single instances. A child is right to avoid burn-
ing its fingers on the basis of an induction from a single case after only one 
encounter with a flame, and logicians are right, as George Boole and others 
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have maintained, to accept the rule of modus ponens as deductively valid 
in every application after reflecting on only a single clearcut example. 
Why not then in the defeasible refutation of ontic solipsism? 
The endorsement of theism and of the existence of an intelligent design-
er lacks depth in Rea's concluding chapter, because he does not consider 
theism as a thesis or research program in light of the same kinds of objec-
tions to which he subjects naturalism. A balanced account that could 
enable an impartial reader to judge the pros and cons of naturalism versus 
supernaturalism would need to assess the strengths and weaknesses of 
supernaturalism only after raising comparably motivated criticisms on 
both sides. Rea presents us with detailed objections to naturalism from 
which he suggests that only supernaturalism can rescue metaphysics. The 
problems with supernaturalism, however, beginning with but by no means 
limited to the epistemic inaccessibility of the divine, are potentially even 
more damaging to its prospects than any of the difficulties Rea raises 
against naturalism. Rea speaks indeed of supernaturalism overcoming 
naturalism merely by virtue of adopting the justified belief through a par-
ticular kind of religious experience that there is a divine supernatural 
designer of the universe who has ensured that there is an epistemically 
reliable connection between what it is theoretically useful for us to believe 
and what is in fact true. If anything, the justificatory burdens, possibilities 
for error, misconceptions and paradoxes appear enormously greater in 
Rea's characterization of supernaturalism as a solution to relatively pedes-
trian metaphysical problems about the existence of material objects and 
their modal properties and the existence of other minds than philosophy 
encounters in even the most naive forms of naturalism. 
Rea clearly has a theistic axe to grind in metaphysics. He wants to dis-
credit naturalism because it stands in the way of belief in God. He soft-
pedals this conclusion in several places, stating that he hopes only to con-
vince some naturalists to 'jump ship', holding short of the claim that he has 
decisively disproved naturalism or rigorously demonstrated the necessary 
truth of any form of supernaturalism. But it is peculiar in the first place for 
Rea to oppose theism and naturalism, when we recall that in the eigh-
teenth century the argument from design for the existence of God was 
known by proponents and critics alike as natural theology or natural reli-
gion. Rea reminds us in one place that naturalists need not be atheists, 
despite their close affirnity, but he argues that naturalism as he under-
stands the concept is incompatible with the view that the world is designed 
or the handiwork of a divine intelligent supernatural designer. Rea is well 
aware of the eighteenth century connection between theism and natural-
ism, but he tailors his cursory survey of the history of naturalism to begin 
only from the mid-nineteenth century onward, thereby avoiding a host of 
interesting questions about naturalism and belief in the existence of God. 
If we think of naturalism in a less constrained way, then we need not 
exclude William Paley and David Hume as naturalists interested in the 
question of God's existence, who are willing to consider the implications of 
the natural science of their day for the hypothesis that the order that pre-
vails in the natural world as revealed by empirical inquiry might or even 
must be the direct result of intelligent design. The lack of any prior basis in 
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Rea's account for deciding what is and what is not a proper example of 
naturalism haunts his discussion, and leaves a mystery surrounding his 
choice of John Dewey and W.V. Quine as his paradigm naturalists, to the 
exclusion of Franz Brentano, Ernst Mach, Bertrand Russell, Gilbert Ryle, 
David Armstrong, among numerously many others, even within the nar-
rowly circumscribed historical period to which Rea limits his overview. 
The problems besetting the argument in Rea's critique of naturalism 
make it hard to recommend the book on its philosophical merits. The 
questions it raises are nevertheless important and enduring. Whatever 
confusions pervade the work, Rea presents a remarkable dialectical con-
frontation between approaches to the philosophy of science and religion, 
betv-.'een naturalism and supernaturalism, that is certain to provoke contin-
uing debate and to enliven the perennial dispute concerning these funda-
mentally opposed ways of understanding the natural world with or with-
out design. 
